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## NOTES ON THE IAC REFERENCES IN THE DULLES REPORT

## Section 1: CIA's Position on CONCLUSIONS

*For DCI's approval or change.*

(To be discussed at Standing Committee Meeting February 9th)

ON PAGE 27

"The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered and encouraged to establish, through its Director, closer liaison with the two members of the National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends; namely, the Secretaries of State and Defense."

We do not understand how he is to be "empowered" by all the members of the National Security Council to do this with two of their members, or "encouraged" to do this by them, or by the IAC. He has frequent contacts with them already.

ON PAGE 63

"Another important area (where more active efforts at coordination are needed) is that of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence, in so far as they relate to the national security. To improve coordination in this area, and between it and the entire intelligence field, we recommend that the FBI should be made a member of the IAC."

We are checking on the actual facts pertaining to the FBI withdrawal from the former IAB, but as yet have found nothing showing that they formerly were a permanent member. The last meeting that they attended was August 26, 1946. It is provided, nowadays, that they can be invited to attend meetings pertaining to matters in which they are concerned.

We think this is adequate.

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"The Director of Central Intelligence should be made permanent chairman of the United States Communications Intelligence Board."

*not IAC*

The DCI prefers not to be chairman. He thinks that the present system of rotating chairmen is working out satisfactorily.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived, but it should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities."

The IAC, nowadays, is meeting more regularly for coordination purposes, and there is more joint preparation now for the Secretary of Defense briefings, AEC, Senate and House reports, etc.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The Intelligence Advisory Committee should consist of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the FBI. Other departments and agencies would sit as ad hoc members when appropriate."

The DCI is opposed to dropping from the IAC either the JIG or the AEC.

ON PAGE 81

"Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, these estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted IAC, whose members should assume collective responsibility for them."

The DCI considers our estimates are now discussed with the IAC Agencies (not necessarily with the IAC Members themselves, or with all of them together at the same time,) and that when a concurrence is received from an IAC Agency, that constitutes a part of "collective responsibility."

*"No."*  
*Says*  
*Standing*  
*Committee*

Note for the Director from ICAPS: We think CIA's Review of the World

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every month for the NSC. Nowadays it does not have a variable publication date but is issued rather on the third Thursday of every month. The IAC Agencies could adapt themselves, if necessary, to meet this dead line. ORE claims this "Current Intelligence" need not be coordinated. If it were, it would certainly enhance its value and be more authoritative.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Provision should be made in these arrangements for the handling of crisis situations when coordinated estimates are required without delay."

The example cited in the Report has been discussed and arrangements have been made among the IAC Members to avoid recurrence in the future and to have more satisfactory handling of "crisis situations."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this way, must in order to be effective, be recognized as the most authoritative estimates available to the policy makers."

If an estimate has been produced and disseminated by CIA, it is out of their hands and we cannot assure how it will be received by the recipient. We do attempt to bring about credence in CIA estimates. (See note Page 81, third paragraph.)

ON PAGE 149

"There should be effective coordination between the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the field of military estimates and that of the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Advisory Committee in the field of national estimates."

We now assist in military estimates of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Joint Intelligence Committee can dissent from CIA estimates through the military departments, or through their representative

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on the IAC. We think this coordination is working effectively.

ON PAGE 161

The State Department will have to decide whether any of these recommendations are to affect the IAC or just the internal affairs of the State Department.

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SECTION 2

CIA's Position on References to IAC

ON PAGE 3

"What is needed is continuing and effective coordinating action under existing directives and also directives establishing more precisely the responsibility of the various intelligence agencies."

If directives were fully implemented, there would be better coordination.

CIA now has under paragraph 2 of NSCID No. 1 authority to inspect only intelligence material.

IAC agencies heretofore have objected to precisely defining scope and limits of departmental intelligence activities.

ON PAGE 4

IAC now has more frequent meetings.

ON PAGE 6

PREPARATION vs ASSEMBLY OF REPORTS

→ The basic question is "who prepares initial draft" (NSCID 1, paragraph 4; NSCID 3, paragraph 3; DCI 3/1, paragraph 3). Nowadays CIA usually does prepare initial draft and circulate it rather than ask IAC Agencies for initial drafts and then assemble and evaluate them into National Intelligence. CIA is delinquent in too frequently following the first procedure rather than the second. See bottom of Page 66 of Report, and top of Page 69.

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ON PAGE 7

See comments under Page 6.

See comments under Page 81 CONCLUSIONS.

So far as we know the IAC Agencies do "secure the views of the best qualified technical experts available" - but how CIA does ~~not~~ know.

See comment under Page 63, CONCLUSIONS.

ON PAGE 9

CIA already has a new Office of Scientific Intelligence working closely with interested agencies.

NSCID 3 covers "allocation of work."

ON PAGES 12 and 13

No concern of CIA. We too are against Sin.

ON PAGE 26

Covered on Page 27 CONCLUSIONS.

ON PAGES 43 - 45

IAC NOT to be Board of Governors.

See Section on Page 81 CONCLUSIONS, re preparations of estimates.

"Increasing the responsibility" of IAC to the extent of being a Board of Directors is NOT consistent with the Act and is contrary to the tenor of strong central direction emphasized so frequently throughout this Report.

See Page 63 CONCLUSIONS, and Page 4.

An advisory committee is sound.

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ON PAGE 46

The Standing Committee - to be, or not to be?

ON PAGE 50

O.K. as in comments on Pages 43-45.

ON PAGE 54

Up to IAC re supervision of ways in which directives are carried out.

ON PAGES 57 and 58

See "Comments on Page 63."

We agree that closer working relationship with FBI should be affected.

ON PAGES 60 and 61

"Dignified acquiescence vs hearty cooperation."

See Comments on Page 6.

See Comments on Page 63, CONCLUSIONS.

ON PAGES 66 and 67

See Comments on Page 6.

ON PAGE 69

See Comments on Page 6.

We concur that a national intelligence estimate "should be based on all available information and be prepared with full knowledge of our own plans and in the light of our own policy requirements" - but CIA does not now receive all such information. The intelligence agencies themselves do not get this within their own departments.

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ON PAGE 72

See Comments on Page 6.

ON PAGES 74 and 75

See Comments on Page 81 in CONCLUSIONS.

ON PAGE 77

Is the IAC to sit down together to clear each estimate?

See Comment on Page 81, CONCLUSIONS.

See Comments on Pages 43-45.

ON PAGES 78 and 79

See Comments on Page 63, CONCLUSIONS.

ON PAGE 80

IAC to provide a double check after CIA has assembled and evaluated the original products.

ON PAGE 113

How much of area of common concern in Economic, Scientific, Technological intelligence will IAC Agencies accept?

Give primary production responsibility to CIA??? in these presently unassigned fields (Cf NSCID 3).

ON PAGE 114

See Comment on Pages 63 and 119 of CONCLUSIONS.

ON PAGES 152, 158, 160

See Comments on Page 161 of CONCLUSIONS.

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